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1971/09/13

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Authority NND 979520
By LEB NARA Date 10/14

September 13, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER
SUBJECT: September 13 meeting with the
Chinese Ambassador in Paris

I met with Huang Chen, the Chinese Ambassador in Paris, for almost two hours on September 13 before my other session, primarily to lay the groundwork for your trip to Peking and my interim visit. This meeting, the third that we have had, was once again extremely cordial.

Announcement of Trips

The Ambassador read an oral note from Peking, the full text of which is attached at Tab A. In response to our messages of August 16 and September 1 the Chinese made the following points:

-- They propose a four-day visit to Peking to make concrete arrangements for your trip. This should begin on October 20 (Peking time). I accepted this as it matched our proposals for length and timing.

-- The Chinese proposed announcing my visit on October 14. I made clear why we had suggested September 21 or 22: in addition to making the necessary arrangements for my travel, we preferred to announce my trip before Gromyko came to the U.S. on his annual visit to the UN. I explained that we did not want our announcement with the Chinese to look like a reaction to Gromyko's visit, during which the Soviets might well pin down your trip to Moscow, now that the conditions for it have been met in various negotiations. I said that I would have to check with you regarding the October 14 date for the announcement and asked them to let us know if they had any different views (i.e. moving it up) as a result of this discussion.

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-- The Chinese proposed that the date of your trip be fixed during my visit rather than being included in the October announcement. I did not dispute this, but pointed out that given the complexity of your schedule we would want to know if they had any date in mind other than the two we had given them (February 21 and March 16); that it would be very difficult to arrange another completely different date; and that we would hold open the two alternatives we had suggested pending my trip to Peking. The Ambassador thought that this problem could be easily solved during my visit.

-- I said that we would respond to the Chinese proposals and suggested text for an announcement within the next few days.

-- Comment. I believe the Chinese think that setting a date now for your trip would have overtones of collusion. They prefer to have a date fixed as a result of my trip so that they can say it was for that purpose. I see no problem in waiting until late October and giving the interim trip a concrete outcome. Thus I think we can accept the text of the proposed Chinese announcement.

From their point of view a late date for the announcement puts it beyond their national day (October 1) and that of the Nationalists (October 10), and cuts down on the period of speculation. They are, of course, unaware of our October 12 announcement. We have complex scheduling problems, and I want to discuss personally with you our response to the proposed date of October 14.

Preparations for Peking Trips

In order to get the Chinese to do advance thinking, to pave the way for my trip, and to begin to shape a successful outcome for your trip, I gave the Chinese some technical questions and substantive suggestions.

-- On the technical side, I explained and handed over lists of questions which I had gone over with Bob Haldeman and a few others on the White House Staff. I suggested that my party would number about 10 people, both substantive and technical. I explained the responsibilities of each of the

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latter (advance man, press, White House Communications Agency, Secret Service). I said we were prepared to begin the technical advance work later, but it was preferable to get going on this during my visit. I added that we believed that a minimum of 100 to 150 press were needed for your trip and asked for their views both as to minimum and maximum numbers. They seemed clearly taken aback even by the minimum number. For this reason I did not raise the issue of the ground station.

-- I outlined the topics that the Prime Minister and I should cover concerning your visit, including: the length (up to seven days); itinerary (Peking and perhaps two other stops); party composition (small working group); and agenda (subjects that Chou and I covered plus more technical issues like trade and exchange programs). I said that private meetings between Chou and me would be necessary for particularly sensitive subjects and that similarly you would want private sessions during your visit.

-- Among the subjects Chou and I should discuss are the concrete results that could emerge from your trip. I gave as illustrations periodic special envoys between our two countries; a return visit by Chou to the U.S.; agreements we have already made with the Soviet Union such as accidental war and hot line communications; and various types of cultural, scientific, and other exchange programs.

-- The Ambassador commented that we certainly had thought of everything concerning these trips, a specific indication of the fact that they seem genuinely impressed by our meticulousness.

Other Topics

-- Romania. I summarized our policy that I had outlined to the Romanian Ambassador and that you would reaffirm personally to him: that the U.S. has a major interest in the independence and autonomous policy of Romania, that we would not contribute to a collusion that would allow another great power to infringe on these principles, and that we would make clear that pressures for military action are not consistent with a relaxation of tensions.

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-- Pakistan. I briefly indicated the new assistance we were contemplating for Pakistan, i.e. arranging for debt relief of \$75 million and providing 75 percent of the \$250 - 300 million that would be needed for relief in East Pakistan.

-- Taiwan. In view of intense press speculation (in particular concerning the UN question), I said that we stood by all that I had said on this issue to Chou when I was in Peking.

-- Kissinger Trip to Japan. I noted that the Japanese press speculation of my visiting Japan was wrong and that I had no such plans.

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Text of Chinese Oral Note
Presented September 13, 1971

The Chinese Government agrees that Dr. Kissinger's four day interim visit to China should take place beginning October 20.

According to its customary practice, the Chinese side would issue a press release only upon Dr. Kissinger's arrival in China and not in advance. But if the U.S. side deems it necessary to make the visit known beforehand, the Chinese side proposes that the two sides issue on October 14 their respective press releases of the same content in the following wording:

"The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America have agreed that Dr. Kissinger will visit Peking in the latter part of October for talks with the Chinese Government to make concrete arrangements for President Nixon's visit to China."

As for the U.S. proposal regarding the time of President Nixon's visit to China, it may be discussed and decided upon during Dr. Kissinger's interim visit.

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